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THE PROMISE AND SHORTCOMINGS OF PRIVACY
MULTISTAKEHOLDER POLICYMAKING: A CASE
STUDY
Omer Tene and J. Trevor Hughes*
A: I think the notion of a multistakeholder process was bolstered, not by thinking
that it will work necessarily, but rather because it’s so easy to call for. That’s a
classic line: “we need a dialogue!” You don’t have to take a position on the issue;
you don’t have to do anything about an issue to say, “We should talk about it.”
Q: So, it’s basically a cop out?
1

A: I think that’s right.

I. INTRODUCTION
With formal privacy policymaking processes mired in discord, governments
and regulators in the United States and Europe have turned to the private sector
seeking assistance and solutions. Multistakeholder-driven self-regulation and coregulation have been pursued in a variety of contexts ranging from online privacy
and transparency for mobile applications to protection of transborder data flows.
This Article focuses on one such process, the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)
discussion of a Do Not Track (DNT) standard, as a case study.2 It critically
analyzes the procedural pitfalls, which hampered the quest to reach a compromise
solution acceptable by groups with diametrically opposed interests, including
industry players, government regulators, and privacy advocates. It is based on a
series of interviews that the Authors conducted with participants in the process,
including leading industry, civil society, and government players.3
Proponents of multistakeholder processes, including the U.S. government,
suggest that this mode of policymaking benefits from important advantages,
including an opportunity to coopt industry experts, move swiftly to conclusion, and
garner industry support.4 The reality, however, is that the W3C process featured

* Omer Tene is Vice President of Research and Education and J. Trevor Hughes President and
CEO of the International Association of Privacy Professionals. The Authors would like to thank
Jonathan Mayer, Joanne McNabb, John Verdi, and Alexander Hanff, as well as two additional
interviewees who asked to remain anonymous, for their valuable time and thoughtful insights, and
Jedidiah Bracy, Andrew Clearwater, and Sam Pfeifle for invaluable comments. Special thanks to
Kelsey Finch for excellent, thorough research assistance.
1. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Mayer, Stanford University graduate student in computer
science and law, and an invited expert to the W3C process (Dec. 6, 2013) [hereinafter Mayer Interview].
2. See Nick Doty & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Internet Multistakeholder Processes and Techno—Policy
Standards Initial Reflections on Privacy at the World Wide Web Consortium, 11 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 135 (2013).
3. Given that the interviews focused not on substantive issues but rather on the mechanics of the
process, we allowed some of the interviewees to remain anonymous. We believe that an “off the record”
discussion better captured their candid criticism and allowed them to speak freely.
4. Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for Protecting Privacy and
Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy, THE WHITE HOUSE 23-27 (Feb. 23, 2012),
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few of these benefits. It was protracted, rife with hardball rhetoric and combat
tactics, based on inconsistent factual claims, and under constant threat of becoming
practically irrelevant due to lack of industry buy-in.
Perhaps this should not be surprising. The way DNT has been framed—as a
veritable “on/off” switch for an entire industry—inevitably raised the stakes for a
common accord.5 Indeed, DNT crystallizes a deep ideological divide about right
and wrong in online behavior, with one side arguing that merely collecting users’
information is wrong, and the other side claiming a right—in fact a business
imperative—to use such information for multiple goals.6 Add to that a healthy
portion of competitive maneuvering within the industry, and you get a combustive
mix.
As the discussions progressed, they became increasingly contentious and
polarized, with the most extreme voices on either side of the ideological divide
leading the way.7 Moreover, they were subject to the disruptive force of exogenous
factors, not the least of which was the unilateral decision by Microsoft, a major
browser maker, to automatically set DNT on by default.8 This development, in and
of itself, may very well have been the death knell of an already a stagnant process.
Critics could argue that self-regulation would be better served without a
preceding multistakeholder process. Let the industry devise rules for itself, at most
soliciting comments from civil society and regulators. Yet codes of conduct
drafted by industry for industry are often derided as a self-serving ruse intended to
avert formal regulation.9 As one privacy advocacy organization notes, “We now
have repetitive, specific, tangible examples of failed self-regulation in the area of
privacy.”10
Others could argue that the W3C was ill-suited in the first place to engage in a
highly divisive policy debate of this nature. Primarily a technical standard-setting
body, W3C, which is run by engineers, was not prepared to resolve policy conflicts

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf [hereinafter White House Privacy
Framework].
5. Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, To Track or “Do Not Track”: Advancing Transparency and
Individual Control in Online Behavioral Advertising, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 281, 334 (2012).
6. Id.
7. See Laura Stampler, Firefox Launches 'Nuclear First Strike Against Ad Industry,' BUS. INSIDER
(Feb. 25, 2013, 9:36 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/firefox-to-block-third-party-cookies-20132#ixzz2vWG3wFFc.
8. Brendon Lynch, Advancing Consumer Trust and Privacy: Internet Explorer in Windows 8,
MICROSOFT ON THE ISSUES (May 31, 2012, 5:00 PM), http://blogs.technet.com/b/
microsoft_on_the_issues/archive/2012/05/31/advancing-consumer-trust-and-privacy-internet-explorerin-windows-8.aspx.
9. Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Privacy Self-Regulation: A Decade of Disappointment, ELEC. PRIVACY
INFO. CTR. 1 (Mar. 4, 2005), http://epic.org/reports/decadedisappoint.pdf; Robert Gellman & Pam
Dixon, Many Failures: A Brief History of Privacy Self-Regulation in the United States, WORLD
PRIVACY FORUM 4 (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-content/uploads/
2011/10/WPFselfregulationhistory.pdf.
10. World Privacy Forum, Comments of the World Privacy Forum Regarding the Federal Trade
Commission Preliminary Staff Report, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: A
Proposed Framework for Business and Policymakers, FED. TRADE COMM’N 3 (Feb. 18, 2011),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_comments/preliminary-ftc-staff-reportprotecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-proposed-framework/00376-58005.pdf.
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among scores of lawyers and government affairs professionals. Its decisionmaking processes were fickle and revolved around a seemingly endless list of
repetitive, overlapping issues.11 Like Goethe’s Sorcerer's Apprentice,12 the W3C
experienced every effort to close an issue while simultaneously opening several
new ones. It is perhaps telling that after more than two years of discussions, the
group has not yet been able to define the term “tracking,” the raison d'être for the
process.13 Rules on representation were vague and included a pay-to-play entry
barrier that may have skewed the composition of the group towards more
resourceful stakeholders.14
Part II of this Article analyzes the difficulties facing formal policymaking
processes in the field of privacy. Rapidly evolving technologies, shifting business
models, and polarized social and cultural norms complicate the quest for a
simplified privacy policy. This has led policymakers to turn to the private sector
for help. Part III sets forth the opportunities and risks of multistakeholder-driven
self-regulatory and co-regulatory models. Part IV of the Article assesses
multistakeholder processes in practice, focusing on the W3C discussion of DNT as
a case study. It shows that, counter to conventional wisdom, a multistakeholder
process could turn out to be neither faster moving nor more collaborative than topdown regulation, and may be set for little or no industry adoption even in the
unlikely case that it is resolved. The Article does not set out to, nor does it, prove
that all multistakeholder processes are destined to fail. Rather, it seeks to draw
lessons from one particular attempt at multistakeholder policymaking in order to
help improve new processes down the road. Part V concludes, setting forth basic
recommendations for the future.
II. FORMAL POLICYMAKING
Policymaking in the field of information privacy has been laden with discord.
For many years, the United States has been debating the merits, format, and
sometimes contents of comprehensive privacy legislation,15 yet, there is no end to
the debate in sight.16 In the European Union, where privacy law is clearly in need
of reform,17 policymakers are embroiled in what seem to be endless heated
discussions around the minutia of a 119-page legislative document submitted more

11. See discussion infra Part IV.A.3.
12. JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, THE SORCERER'S APPRENTICE (Edwin Zeydel trans., 1955)
(1779), available at http://germanstories.vcu.edu/goethe/zauber_e3.html.
13. See Issue-5: What is the Definition of Tracking?, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM,
http://www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/track/issues/5 (last visited Mar. 22, 2014) (settling on a
definition of “tracking” that is dependent on several additional yet-to-be resolved issues, such as an
explanation of permitted tracking).
14. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
15. Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 877, 897-98
(2003).
16. Somini Sengupta, No U.S. Action, So States Move on Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2013,
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/31/technology/no-us-action-so-states-move-onprivacy-law.html.
17. See Omer Tene, Privacy Law’s Midlife Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the Second Wave of
Global Privacy Laws, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1232-34 (2013).
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than two years ago by the European Commission.18 The embattled legislative
process periodically flares into mutual recriminations between European
institutions and sometimes even national strife.19
Perhaps this should come as no surprise, given that even the basic tenets of
privacy law are rife with ambiguity. For more than a century, scholars and jurists
have vigorously argued over the definition of privacy,20 and notwithstanding
several compelling theories, the discussion continues unabated today. The framing
of other foundational terms remains similarly elusive. Even where plaintiffs prove
the elements of a privacy cause of action, they often run into difficulty when asked
to show harm,21 given the lack of legal consensus over whether privacy harms are
legally cognizable.22 Personally identifiable information, the most basic building
block of an information privacy framework, remains one of the most contentious
concepts in privacy, igniting frequent disputes between engineers and lawyers
involving science, philosophy, and a healthy dosage of political spin.23 Another
charged concept is that of consent, a veritable trump card in privacy interactions,
abused almost as often as it is used, and meaning dramatically different things to
different people, companies, and regulators.24
Privacy is highly culturally dependent, stoking persistent discord between
Europe and the U.S.25 Despite some convergence around high-level principles
known as the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs),26 there continues to be
significant disharmony with respect to the general place of information privacy in

18. Christopher Kuner, Cédric Burton, & Anna Pateraki, The Proposed EU Data Protection
Regulation Two Years Later, BNA PRIVACY & SEC. L. REP. 1-2 (Jan. 2014),
http://www.wsgr.com/eudataregulation/pdf/kuner-010614.pdf.
19. See, e.g., Kelly Fiveash, EU Legal Eagle Legal: Data Protection Reforms 'Very Bad Outcome'
for Citizens, THE REGISTER, Dec. 9, 2013, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/12/09/
eu_data_protection_reforms_hits_legal_roadblock; EU To Push Ahead On Data Protection Despite UK
Opposition, EURACTIV.COM, Oct. 28, 2013, http://www.euractiv.com/specialreport-digital-singlemar/commission-push-ahead-data-prote-news-531357.
20. See, e.g., ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of
Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006); HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY,
POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 2 (2010); Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy is For, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 1904 (2013).
21. M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1132 (2011).
22. Id.
23. See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of
Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1816 (2011); Paul Ohm, Broken Promises
of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1704
(2010).
24. Omer Tene & Christopher Wolf, The Draft EU General Data Protection Regulation: Costs and
Paradoxes of Explicit Consent (Future of Privacy Forum White Paper, Jan. 2013), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/121642539/The-Draft-EU-General-Data-Protection-Regulation-Costs-andParadoxes-of-Explicit-Consent.
25. Omer Tene, Privacy in Europe and the United States: I Know It When I See It, CTR. FOR
DEMOCRACY & TECH. BLOG (June 27, 2011), https://cdt.org/blogs/privacy-europe-and-united-states-iknow-it-when-i-see-it.
26. Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., The Evolving Privacy Landscape: 30 Years After the
OECD Privacy Guidelines, in THE OECD PRIVACY FRAMEWORK 70-71 (July 11, 2013),
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf.
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law.27 At the risk of oversimplification, Europeans view information privacy as a
fundamental human right, whereas the U.S. treats it as a matter of tort law and
consumer protection.28 At the same time, the parties to the cross-Atlantic
discussion often seem to be talking past each other. For example, while Europe
waves the “fundamental right” flag as it depicts U.S. privacy law as “inadequate,”
Europeans sometimes forget that privacy is a constitutional right in the U.S.,
protected by the Fourth Amendment as well as through “penumbras of privacy” in
the Constitution.29 And while Americans tend to portray the European framework
as bureaucratic and overly prescriptive, it is often U.S. law with its layers upon
layers of federal and state statutes, regulatory and individual enforcement, that is
daunting to operationalize.30
The heart of the matter is that privacy raises genuine dilemmas and thorny
legal questions. First, it consistently collides with other constitutional rights and
weighty policy interests. For example, privacy often restricts freedom of speech,
the cornerstone of constitutional liberties in the U.S. and a forceful fundamental
right in Europe.31 Similarly, it often conflicts with the interests of national security
and law enforcement agencies, which seek to collect as much information as
possible in their intelligence gathering and enforcement operations.32 An obstacle
to the free flow of information, privacy is anathema to free market theorists like
Richard Posner, who pronounced it overrated, dangerous, and “really just a
euphemism for concealment, for hiding specific things about ourselves from
others.”33
Second, the formation of a coherent privacy policy is impeded by the lightning
speed of innovation in the technology industry. The surge in technological
developments makes privacy policymaking a moving target.34 Consider the
laborious process in Europe for amending the Electronic Communications Privacy
Directive, colloquially known as the “Cookie Directive.”35 By the time the
legislation, which requires users’ opt-in consent for website cookie use,36 was
passed, the technological landscape shifted to supplant cookies with server-side
tracking alternatives and embedded device identifiers.37

27. See generally Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy in Europe: Initial Data
on Governance Choices and Corporate Practices, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1529 (2013).
28. See id. at 1539-47.
29. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
30. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 23, at 1872-77.
31. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011); Campbell v. MGN Ltd.,
[2004] UKHL 22 [12] (U.K.); Von Hannover v. Germany (No. 2), 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. 228, ¶ 69.
32. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Cyberthreat, Government Network Operations, and the Fourth
Amendment, in CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 47, 57-60 (Jeffrey Rosen
& Benjamin Wittes eds., 2011).
33. Richard A. Posner, Privacy is Overrated, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 28, 2013, 4:19 AM,
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/privacy-overrated-article-1.1328656.
34. See generally, Omer Tene, Privacy Law’s Midlife Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the Second
Wave of Global Privacy Laws, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217 (2013).
35. Council Directive 2009/136, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 11 (EC).
36. Id. art. 2, §§ (5)-(6).
37. Kelsey Finch, Cookie Monsters of Silicon Valley Come to Brussels, IAPP: THE PRIVACY
ADVISOR,
Nov.
25,
2013,
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Third, the social norms underlying privacy policy are in constant flux. With
technological innovation rapidly driving new models for business and inviting new
types of socialization, policymakers often have nothing more than fleeting
intuitions as to what is right or wrong.38 As new technologies strain our social
norms, a shared understanding of privacy etiquette becomes even more difficult to
capture.39 Yet for businesses that make money by leveraging newly available data
sources, it is critical to operationalize these subjective notions into coherent
business and policy strategies. This, in turn, exerts more pressure on policymakers
to deliver results expeditiously.
III. MULTISTAKEHOLDER POLICYMAKING: A PROMISING PATH?
Against this backdrop, it is clear why governments and legislatures have
coopted the public for assistance in the policymaking process. The U.S. has
engaged the private sector in self-regulatory efforts for more than a decade,
culminating in the Obama administration’s call for a structured set of
multistakeholder processes as a pillar of its privacy strategy.40
As one
commentator notes, “[The FTC and DOC] argue that self-regulation can protect
privacy in a more flexible and cost-effective manner than direct regulation without
impeding the rapid pace of innovation in Internet-related businesses.”41
Proponents of multistakeholder self-regulatory and co-regulatory solutions
suggest that these modes of policymaking benefit from distinct advantages vis-à-vis
the legislative process.42 They argue that these collaborative mechanisms tap into
industry knowledge and expertise, producing more practical and effective rules,43
can produce solutions in a more timely fashion than formal regulatory processes,44
and are more likely to rally industry support and adoption than top-down
regulation.45 Critics argue that privacy self-regulation reflects industry subterfuge
intended to avert (or at the very least delay) regulation,46 tends to be overly lax and

https://www.privacyassociation.org/publications/cookie_monsters_of_silicon_valley_come_
to_brussels.
38. Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy and Shifting Social
Norms, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 2) (available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2326830).
39. Id.
40. White House Privacy Framework, supra note 4.
41. Ira S. Rubinstein, Privacy and Regulatory Innovation: Moving Beyond Voluntary Codes, 6
ISJLP 355, 356 (2011).
42. Dennis D. Hirsch, In Search of the Holy Grail: Achieving Global Privacy Rules Through
Sector-Based Codes of Conduct, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1029, 1041-42 (2013) (citing Neil Gunningham &
Joseph Rees, Industry Self-regulation: An Institutional Perspective, 19 L. & POL’Y 363, 366 (1997)); see
Rubinstein, supra note 41, at 357-58; Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative
State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 22 (1997).
43. Hirsch, supra note 42, at 1041-42.
44. White House Privacy Framework, supra note 4, at 23.
45. Hirsch, supra note 43, at 1041-42; Dennis D. Hirsch, Going Dutch? Collaborative Dutch
Privacy Regulation and the Lessons It Holds for U.S. Privacy Law, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 83, 104.
46. Hoofnagle, supra note 9, at 5; Gellman & Dixon, supra note 9, at 25. Hirsch points out that
unlike self-regulation, co-regulation is less amenable to industry capture given the involvement of
government and regulators. Hirsch, supra note 43, at 1045-46.
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serve a public relations rather than a regulatory function,47 and has a poor track
record for compliance and enforcement.48
A. FTC Support
In July 1999, the FTC issued a report to Congress titled “Self-Regulation and
Online Privacy,” in which it stated that legislation to address online privacy was
inappropriate in the face of industry efforts to self-regulate.49 In evaluating the
state of online privacy self-regulation, the report stressed that “self-regulation is the
least intrusive and most efficient means to ensure fair information practices, given
the rapidly evolving nature of the Internet and computer technology.”50 The FTC
report and preceding consultations spawned a number of self-regulatory efforts,
including the Network Advertising Initiative (NAI) and the BBBOnline Privacy
Program, a subsidiary of the Council of Better Business Bureaus.51
Over the years, the FTC’s support for and interest in a self-regulatory privacy
framework has waxed and waned.52 In 2010, as privacy in online behavioral
47. COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY: POLICY
INSTRUMENTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 154 (2006).
48. Hirsch, supra note 43, at 1043; Gellman & Dixon, supra note 9, at 4, 6, 9.
49. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, “Self-Regulation and Privacy Online,” FTC Report to
Congress (July 13, 1999) (available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/1999/07/selfregulation-and-privacy-online-ftc-report-congress); see Self-Regulation and Privacy Online: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Commc’ns of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 106th Cong. 4-5
(1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/preparedstatement-federal-trade-commission-self-regulation-and-privacy-online/privacyonlinetestimony.pdf
(prepared statement of Robert Pitofsky, Chairmain, Fed. Trade Comm'n).
50. Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 49.
51. See ROBERT GELLMAN & PAM DIXON, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM, MANY FAILURES: A BRIEF
HISTORY OF PRIVACY SELF-REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 7-8 (Oct. 14, 2011), available at
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/WPFselfregulationhistory.pdf.
For
information on how these programs have evolved, see BBB EU Safe Harbor Program, COUNCIL FOR
BETTER BUS. BUREAUS, http://www.bbb.org/council/eusafeharbor (last visited Apr. 21, 2014); NAI
Code Enforcement, NETWORK ADVER. INITIATIVE, http://www.networkadvertising.org/codeenforcement (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
52.For example, just a year after its 1999 report advocating self-regulation and legislative restraint,
the FTC reported to Congress that, although there had been improvement in industry self-regulatory
efforts, the robustness of these processes was unsatisfactory. Privacy Online: Fair Information
Practices in the Electronic Marketplace, a Report to Congress, FED. TRADE COMM’N ii (May 2000),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-fair-information-practiceselectronic-marketplace-federal-trade-commission-report/privacy2000text.pdf. Accordingly, a majority
of the commissioners concluded that it was time for legislation requiring online businesses to comply
with the FIPPs. Id. at 36-38. In December 2007, following a “Behavioral Advertising Town Hall” that
led to a public discussion about the need to address privacy concerns in this area, the FTC issued for
public comment a set of proposed principles to encourage and guide industry self-regulation. Press
Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff Revises Online Behavioral Advertising Principles (Feb. 12,
2009) (available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2009/02/ftc-staff-revises-onlinebehavioral-advertising-principles). In 2009, the FTC issued a report, titled “Self-Regulatory Principles
for Online Behavioral Advertising,” setting forth revisions to proposed principles to govern selfregulatory efforts in this area. FTC Staff Report: Self-Regulatory Principles for Online Behavioral
Advertising, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Feb. 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/
federal-trade-commission-staff-report-self-regulatory-principles-online-behavioral-advertising/
p085400behavadreport.pdf. Commissioner Jon Leibowitz issued a separate concurring statement
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advertising remerged as a primary item on the FTC’s agenda, self-regulation was
once again put forth as a possible solution.53 To be sure, the FTC stated in its
Preliminary Staff Report that “industry efforts to address privacy through selfregulation have been too slow, and up to now have failed to provide adequate and
meaningful protection.”54 Yet, it also it made clear that it “supports a more
uniform and comprehensive consumer choice mechanism for online behavioral
advertising, sometimes referred to as ‘Do Not Track’,” adding that “[s]uch a
universal mechanism could be accomplished by legislation or potentially through
robust, enforceable self-regulation.”55
In its final report, issued in 2012, the FTC noted that “industry has made
significant progress in implementing Do Not Track,” referring to tools developed
by browser vendors and commitments undertaken by the Digital Advertising
Alliance (DAA), a broad coalition of industry groups.56 Yet, the FTC particularly
emphasized the work done by the W3C Tracking Protection Working Group (the
“Working Group”), noting that “[t]he W3C group has made substantial progress
toward a standard that is workable in the desktop and mobile settings.”57 Stressing
the multistakeholder nature of this effort, the FTC elaborated that “the W3C
Internet standards-setting body has gathered a broad range of stakeholders to create
an international, industry-wide standard for Do Not Track. The Working Group
includes a wide variety of stakeholders, including DAA members; other U.S.
companies; international companies; industry groups; and public-interest groups.”58
Suffice it to say that, as further discussed infra, the W3C process failed to deliver
on its promise.
attached to the report, noting, “I write separately to ensure that the Report’s endorsement of selfregulation is viewed neither as a regulatory retreat by the Agency nor an imprimatur for current business
practice.” FTC Staff Report: Self-Regulatory Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising, Concurring
Statement of FTC Comm’r Jon Leibowitz, FED. TRADE COMM’N 1 (Feb. 2009),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/concurring-statement-commissionerjon-leibowitz-ftc-staff-report-self-regulatory-principles-online/p085400behavadleibowitz.pdf. He also
states, “Industry needs to do a better job of meaningful, rigorous self-regulation or it will certainly invite
legislation by Congress and a more regulatory approach by our Commission. Put simply, this could be
the last clear chance to show that self-regulation can – and will – effectively protect consumers’ privacy
in a dynamic online marketplace.” Id. This report, too, prompted the industry to launch a number of
self-regulatory initiatives, including the development of new codes of conduct and online tools to allow
consumers more control over the receipt of targeted advertising. See DAA Announces Guidance for
Self-Reg Principles in Mobile Environment, DIGITAL ADVER. ALLIANCE, http://www.aboutads.info (last
visited Apr. 21, 2014).
53. Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: A Proposed Framework for
Businesses and Policymakers, Preliminary FTC Staff Report, FED. TRADE COMM’N iii (Dec. 2010),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-bureau-consumerprotection-preliminary-ftc-staff-report-protecting-consumer/101201privacyreport.pdf [hereinafter FTC
Staff Report]; see also DIGITAL ADVER. ALLIANCE, supra note 52.
54. FTC Staff Report, supra note 53.
55. Id. at 66.
56. Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations for Businesses and
Policymakers,
FED.
TRADE
COMM’N
13
(Mar.
2012),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protectingconsumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf.
57. Id. at 5.
58. Id. at 54.
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B. Department of Commerce Support
Not only the FTC, but also the U.S. Department of Commerce, has actively
promoted multistakeholder policymaking. In its main policy statement on privacy
to date, the Obama administration increased its reliance on the success of
multistakeholder-generated enforceable codes of conduct.59 The administration
promoted: a statutory consumer privacy bill of rights,60 which has yet to materialize
and many doubt that it will;61 strengthening FTC enforcement,62 which similarly
hinges on legislation; and improving global interoperability,63 which is a lofty goal,
albeit without a clear success matrix. Hence, fostering multistakeholder processes
to develop enforceable codes of conduct remains the main actionable item in the
administration’s strategy.
The administration promised to “convene open, transparent forums in which
stakeholders who share an interest in specific markets or business contexts will
work toward consensus on appropriate, legally enforceable codes of conduct.”64 It
encouraged all relevant parties to engage, including “individual companies,
industry groups, privacy advocates, consumer groups, crime victims, academics,
international partners, State Attorneys General, [and] Federal civil and criminal law
enforcement representatives.”65 Citing the success of Internet standard setting
bodies, such as the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and W3C, as well as
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a nonprofit
corporation that coordinates the technical management of the domain name system,
the administration posited that multistakeholder processes underlie many of the
institutions responsible for the Internet’s success.66
It believed that
multistakeholder processes could achieve results with more flexibility, speed, and
decentralization than formal regulatory processes.67
The administration tasked the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA), a Department of Commerce agency responsible for
advising the President on telecommunications and information policy issues, with
convening and facilitating the discussion.68 However, the administration did not
envisage the NTIA as a decision-maker, stating that the “NTIA’s role will be to
help the parties reach clarity on what their positions are and whether there are
options for compromise toward consensus, rather than substituting its own
judgment.”69 Recognizing that a consensus rule can reward intransigence, the
administration proposed that “the parties should discuss and set out rules or
procedures at the outset of the process to govern how the group will reach an

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

White House Privacy Framework, supra note 4, at 2.
Id. at 1-2, 35-36.
See Sengupta, supra note 16.
White House Privacy Framework, supra note 4, at 2, 29-30.
Id. at 2-3, 31-33.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 27.
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orderly conclusion, even if there is not complete agreement on results.”70 The
discussions were intended to produce codes of conduct for various industry groups
or sectors.71
The administration foresaw a co-regulatory model,72 featuring
multistakeholder created codes of conduct backed by FTC enforcement.73 Under
Section 5 of the FTC Act, the FTC is empowered to enforce a code of conduct
pursuant to a company’s voluntary decision to enroll.74 The administration
suggested that companies’ incentive to engage in the process would be twofold:
building consumer trust and benefitting from a safe harbor to FTC enforcement.75
Moreover, the administration envisaged that the FTC would have explicit
statutory authority to review codes of conduct against prospective privacy
legislation.76 Importantly, “the Administration recommends . . . giving the FTC the
authority to grant a ‘safe harbor’—that is, forbearance from enforcement of the
statutory Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights—to companies that follow a code of
conduct that the FTC has reviewed and approved.”77 In the absence of such
legislation, however, these new FTC powers are weakened, given that there is no
law to assess the code of conduct against, and no law from which to grant
immunity. Hence, if the administration fails to deliver on the statutory promise in
its strategy, the FTC would have to revert to its current stance: enforcement only
against companies that voluntarily and publicly commit to following a code of
conduct and then fail to deliver.
C. European Union Support
Not only the U.S., but also the EU, promotes self- and co-regulation. Under
Article 27 of the European Data Protection Directive:
(1) The Member States and the Commission shall encourage the drawing up of
codes of conduct intended to contribute to the proper implementation of the
national provisions adopted by the Member States pursuant to this Directive,
taking account of the specific features of the various sectors.
(2) Member States shall make provision for trade associations and other bodies
representing other categories of controllers which have drawn up draft national
codes or which have the intention of amending or extending existing national

70. Id. at 27.
71. Id. at 26.
72. Dennis Hirsch defines co-regulation as a process in which government and private parties share
responsibility for development and enforcement of regulatory rules; they may do so by splitting the
tasks up: “For example, government might set the overall goals but then allow industry to set and
enforce the standards. Or, more commonly, government and the private sector might perform one or
more of the tasks together.” Dennis D. Hirsch, The Law and Policy of Online Privacy: Regulation, SelfRegulation, or Co-Regulation?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 439, 465 (2011).
73. White House Privacy Framework, supra note 4, at 26-27.
74. Id. at 27, 29.
75. Id. at 24.
76. Id. at 37.
77. Id.
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National data protection authorities and the Article 29 Working Party are
authorized to review and confirm the compliance of a multistakeholder code of
conduct with European or national data protection law.79 Interestingly, this
framework has come short of generating co-regulatory zeal. To date, nearly twenty
years after the introduction of the European Data Protection Directive, only one
code of conduct has been submitted for regulatory approval—by the Federation of
European Direct and Interactive Marketing.80
On January 25, 2012, the European Commission proposed a new General Data
Protection Regulation that would replace the European Data Protection Directive.81
Like the European Data Protection Directive, the proposed General Data Protection
Regulation would endorse the development of sector-based codes of conduct,
which could then be submitted for regulatory approval.82 Under Article 38 of the
proposed General Data Protection Regulation, such codes of conduct would be
eligible for approval by the European Commission.83 Furthermore, Article 39 of
the proposed General Data Protection Regulation would authorize new coregulatory mechanisms, namely “the establishment of data protection certification
mechanisms and of data protection seals and marks.”84 Such programs, developed
by the private sector and ratified by the European Commission, would allow
individuals to quickly assess the level of data protection provided by companies.85
IV. ASSESSING MULTISTAKEHOLDER PROCESSES IN PRACTICE: DO NOT TRACK
Despite best intentions, recent efforts at multistakeholder policymaking leave
much to be desired. This Article focuses on a test case, the W3C discussion of a
DNT standard, which at this point, more than two years after its launch, appears to
78. Council Directive 95/46, art. 27(1)-(2), 1995 O.J. (L281) 31 (EC).
79. Id. at art. 28(3)-(4).
80. The only code submitted for approval was the Federation of European Direct and Interactive
Marketing’s (FEDMA) Community Code, which provides a legal safe harbor in all European Member
States to adherent direct marketing firms, and was approved by the Article 29 Data Protection Working
Party in 2003. WORKING PARTY 77, OPINION 3/2003 OF THE ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING
PARTY ON THE EUROPEAN CODE OF CONDUCT OF FEDMA FOR THE USE OF PERSONAL DATA IN DIRECT
MARKETING (June 13, 2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/
2003/wp77_en.pdf (approving FEDMA code); see also WORKING PARTY 174, OPINION 4/2010 OF THE
ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY ON THE EUROPEAN CODE OF CONDUCT OF FEDMA
FOR THE USE OF PERSONAL DATA IN DIRECT MARKETING (July 13, 2010), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/
2010/wp174_en.pdf (approving annex to the FEDMA code covering online marketing).
81. EUR. COMM’N, PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL ON THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH REGARD TO THE PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA
AND ON THE FREE MOVEMENT OF SUCH DATA (GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION) COM
(2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/
review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf.
82. Id. at ch. IV, § 5.
83. Id.
84. Id. See ROWENA RODRIGUES ET AL., EUR. COMM’N JOINT RES. CTR. INST. FOR THE PROT. &
SEC. OF THE CITIZEN, EU PRIVACY SEALS PROJECT, INVENTORY AND ANALYSIS OF PRIVACY
CERTIFICATION SCHEMES, FINAL REPORT STUDY DELIVERABLE 1.4, at 12 (Dec. 2013).
85. Rodrigues et al., supra note 51, at 12.
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be going nowhere and is constantly on the verge of implosion.86 Other processes,
such as the NTIA’s facilitation of a multistakeholder process to develop a code of
conduct on Mobile App Transparency, fared somewhat better, but even there the
process was protracted and yielded a modest result.87 The resulting code has drawn
mixed reviews from the public.88 Importantly, it is not yet clear which company (if
any) will adopt it, what the consequences of noncompliance are, and to what extent
it will change the reality on the ground.89
DNT started as an advocacy group initiative, submitted during an FTC
workshop on behavioral advertising in October 2007.90 The group, led by the
Center for Democracy and Technology, proposed: “To help ensure that [the
privacy] principles are followed, the FTC should [c]reate a national Do Not Track
List similar to the national Do Not Call List.”91 The proposal would have required
advertisers to submit their tracking domains to the FTC, which would make a DNT
list available on its website for download by users who wish to limit tracking.92
The idea remained dormant until July 2009, when privacy advocate
Christopher Soghoian first developed his Targeted Advertising Cookie Opt-Out
(TACO) mechanism as a prototype plug-in that automatically checks for a header

86. Omer Tene, DNT 2.0: What Next for Policymakers?, IAPP: PRIVACY PERSPECTIVES (Sept. 18,
2013), www.privacyassociation.org/privacy_perspectives/post/dnt_2.0_what_next_for_policymakers.
87. Short Form Notice Code of Conduct to Promote Transparency in Mobile App Practices, NAT’L
TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN. (July 25, 2013), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/
july_25_code_draft.pdf.
88. One lawyer said, “It reads like guidance written by lawyers for lawyers. Even then, it's littered
with so many caveats and exemptions about when the Code doesn't apply, it becomes almost impossible
to read.” USA: NTIA App Privacy Code “Littered with Exemptions,” DATAGUIDANCE,
http://dataguidance.com/news.asp?id=2079 (last updated January 8, 2013) (quoting Phil Lee, a partner at
Field Fisher Waterhouse LLP). In a document titled “Head in the Digital Sand: How the Obama
Administration’s NTIA-led Multistakeholder Effort Doesn’t Deliver its Promised Privacy Bill of
Rights,” privacy advocate Jeff Chester of the Center for Digital Democracy laid out a long list of alleged
shortcomings of the NTIA process. See generally JEFF CHESTER, CTR. FOR DIGITAL DEMOCRACY,
HEAD IN THE DIGITAL SAND: HOW THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S NTIA-LED MULTISTAKEHOLDER
EFFORT DOESN’T DELIVER ITS PROMISED PRIVACY BILL OF RIGHTS (Aug. 2013), available at
http://www.centerfordigitaldemocracy.org/sites/default/files/CDDPrivacyObamaAdmReportAugust201
3.pdf. Chester was quoted saying: “The NTIA [] should be nominated to run elections for the
Kremlin[.] . . . They went from ‘There's no consensus’ to ‘There is consensus that the document is final
for now but can be changed in part based on testing.’” Katy Bachman, Privacy Vote Sends Mixed
Signals: No Consensus on Voluntary Code of Conduct for Apps, ADWEEK (July 25, 2013, 6:51 PM),
http://www.adweek.com/news/technology/privacy-vote-sends-mixed-signals-151450.
See
also
Angelique Carson, Did NTIA's Multi-Stakeholder Process Work? Depends on Whom You Ask, IAPP:
THE PRIVACY ADVISOR (Sept. 3, 2013), www.privacyassociation.org/publications/did_ntias_multi_
stakeholder_process_work_depends_whom_you_ask.
89. Some would say that the NTIA is much less equipped to handle a multistakeholder process that
organizations such as the IETF, W3C and ICANN, which have been around much longer and have
policies, procedures, an infrastructure and a culture and a history of multistakeholder negotiations.
90. Ari Schwartz et al., Consumer Rights and Protections in the Behavioral Advertising Sector,
CTR.
FOR
DEMOCRACY
&
TECH.
(Oct.
31,
2007),
www.cdt.org/privacy/
20071031consumerprotectionsbehavioral.pdf; What Does “Do Not Track” Mean? A Scoping Proposal
by the Center for Democracy & Technology, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. 1 (Jan. 31, 2011),
www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CDT-DNT-Report.pdf.
91. Schwartz et al., supra note 90 at 4.
92. Id.
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on a website to determine whether to allow tracking cookies,93 but the concept
failed to resonate with the broader policy or advertising communities.94 DNT first
gained momentum as a viable policy concept on July 27, 2010, when FTC
Chairman Jon Leibowitz testified at the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation on efforts to protect consumer privacy.95 Departing from
scripted remarks, Chairman Leibowitz stated that the FTC was calling for an
industry-led DNT program.96
Initial industry response was hardly enthusiastic, declaring that “[i]f mandated
by the government, this would be tantamount to a government-sponsored, and
possibly managed, ad-blocking program—something inimical to the First
Amendment.”97 DNT was seen as distraction from self-regulatory efforts
organized by advertising industry groups, which were based on icons placed on
behavioral ads and leading to opt-out tools.98 However, the release of the FTC’s
Preliminary Report in December 2010, which stated that “Commission staff
supports a more uniform and comprehensive consumer choice mechanism for
online behavioral advertising, sometimes referred to as ‘Do Not Track’” prompted
the major browser makers to seriously engage with the DNT proposal.99
93. Christopher Soghoian, TACO 2.0 Released, SLIGHT PARANOIA (July 27, 2009, 7:00 AM),
http://paranoia.dubfire.net/2009/07/taco-20-released.html; Jeremy Kirk, Privacy Add-ons Merged to
Create
Powerful
Tool,
PCWORLD
(June
15,
2010,
6:20
AM),
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/198852/privacy_addons_merged_to_create_powerful_to
ol.html; see Christopher Soghoian, The History of the Do Not Track Header, SLIGHT PARANOIA (Jan.
21, 2011, 4:00 PM), http://paranoia.dubfire.net/2011/01/history-of-do-not-track-header.html [hereinafter
History of DNT].
94. History of DNT, supra note 93.
95. See Consumer Online Privacy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp.,
111th Cong. (2010) (testimony of Jon D. Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=Hearings&ContentRecord_id=0bfb9dfc-bbd7-40d68467-3b3344c72235&ContentType_id=14f995b9-dfa5-407a-9d3556cc7152a7ed&Group_id=b06c39af-e033-4cba-9221-de668ca1978a&YearDisplay=2010.
96. Compare id., with Consumer Online Privacy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Commerce, Sci.,
& Transp., 111th Cong. (2010) (prepared statement of Jon D. Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade
Comm’n), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/preparedstatement-federal-trade-commission-consumer-privacy/100727consumerprivacy.pdf.
97. IAB Reviews Preliminary FTC Staff Report on Protecting Consumer Privacy, INTERACTIVE
ADVER. BUREAU (Dec. 1, 2010), www.iab.net/public_policy/1481209.
98. Colin O’Malley, Self-Regulation Solves the Do Not Track Problem, INTERACTIVE ADVER.
BUREAU (Feb. 23, 2011, 4:57 PM), www.iab.net/iablog/2011/02/self-regulation-solves-the-do-.html.
99. The content of this supporting footnote is adapted from Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 5, at
324-26: In December 2010, Microsoft implemented a “Tracking Protection” feature in its new Internet
Explorer 9 browser, allowing users to select a Tracking Protection List (TPL) from a choice provided by
various organizations, such as Abine, EasyList, PrivacyChoice, and TRUSTe. IE9 and Privacy:
Introducing Tracking Protection, WINDOWS INTERNET EXPLORER ENGINEERING TEAM BLOG (Dec. 7,
2010, 1:10 PM), http://blogs.msdn.com/b/ie/archive/2010/12/07/ie9-and-privacy-introducing-trackingprotection-v8.aspx. While presented as an opt-in mechanism, TPL was really an opt-out tool (which
users could choose to opt-into). Nick Wingfield & Julia Angwin, Microsoft Adds Privacy Tool, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 15, 2011, at B1. Despite earlier skepticism about the concept, Microsoft also added a DNT
browser header—which was automatically activated when a TPL (even an empty one) was uploaded—
in its final release of Internet Explorer 9. Id. Mozilla, maker of the Firefox browser, presented an
approach based on a DNT browser header. Aaron Brauer-Rieke, “Do Not Track” Gains Momentum as
Mozilla Announces New Tracking Tool, CTR. DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Jan. 24, 2011),
https://www.cdt.org/blogs/aaron-brauer-rieke/%E2%80%9Cdo-not-track%E2%80%9D-gains-

2014]

PRIVACY MULTISTAKEHOLDER POLICYMAKING

451

In early 2011, W3C received a member submission from Microsoft proposing
standardization of a DNT signal and tracking protection lists.100 An April 2011
workshop on Web Tracking and User Privacy at Princeton University brought
together almost a hundred participants from diverse backgrounds, out of which was
chartered the Working Group.101 The Working Group was formed to “produce
[r]ecommendation-track specifications for a simple machine-readable preference
expression mechanism (‘Do Not Track’) and technologies for selectively allowing
or blocking tracking elements,” and to “define the scope of the user preference and
practices for compliance with it in a way that will inform and be informed by the
technical specification.”102 Its success criteria were set forth as: “Production of
stable Recommendation-track specifications”; and “Adoption of deliverables by
user agents and compliance by industry.”103
The initial Working Group meeting in Princeton already featured some of the
persistent weaknesses that would continue to haunt W3C discussions, such as the
inability to define the nature of the “tracking” that DNT protects users from, as
well as peculiar decision-making processes.104 For example, participants in the
workshop voted on the appropriate definition of “tracking” through two “hum”
momentum-mozilla-announces-new-tracking-tool. In January 2011, Mozilla released Firefox 4, which
allowed users to check a “Do Not Track” box in the “advanced” settings of the browser, prompting a
header to be sent with every click or page request signaling to websites that the user does not wish to be
tracked. Mozilla Firefox 4 Beta, Now Including “Do Not Track” Capabilities, MOZILLA BLOG (Feb. 8,
2011),
https://blog.mozilla.org/blog/2011/02/08/mozilla-firefox-4-beta-now-including-do-not-trackcapabilities. Unlike Microsoft’s TPL solution, the DNT header leaves it entirely up to receiving websites
to honor the user’s request by omitting any tracking cookies from their response. Privacy/Jan2011
DoNotTrack
FAQ,
MOZILLAWIKI
(last
modified
Jan.
24,
2011,
9:56
PM),
https://wiki.mozilla.org/Privacy/Jan2011_DoNotTrack_FAQ.
Google took a different approach,
introducing the Keep My Opt-Outs plug-in, allowing users to permanently opt-out of online behavioral
tracking by companies participating in self-regulatory programs. See Sean Harvey & Rajas Moonka,
Keep Your Opt-outs, GOOGLE PUB. POL’Y BLOG (Jan. 24, 2011, 12:00 PM),
http://googlepublicpolicy.blog spot.com/2011/01/keep-your-opt-outs.html. The new plug-in was meant
to remedy the recurrent problem whereby users cleared out any opt-out cookies when purging their
cookie folder, thus unknowingly re-entering the tracking domain. Harvey & Moonka, supra. Keep My
Opt-Outs is itself cookie based—it deletes all cookies sent by registered domains and adds a DNT
cookie for such domains. Id. Apple too added a DNT tool to a test version of its Safari browser
included within the latest version of Lion, its new operating system. Nick Wingfield, Apple Adds DoNot-Track Tool to New Browser, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2011, at B5.
100. Andy Zeigler, Adrian Bateman, & Eliot Graff, Web Tracking Protection: W3C Member
Submission 24 February 2011, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM (Feb. 24, 2011),
http://www.w3.org/Submission/2011/SUBM-web-tracking-protection-20110224.
101. W3C Workshop on Web Tracking and User Privacy, Workshop Report, WORLD WIDE WEB
CONSORTIUM (Sept. 11, 2011), www.w3.org/2011/track-privacy/report.html [hereinafter Workshop
Report].
102. Tracking Protection Working Group Charter, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM (Sept. 25,
2013), www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/charter.html.
103. Id.
104. Workshop Report, supra note 101 (“Initially, regarding definitions of tracking, two ‘hum’ polls
were taken. Among three choices for tracking—all tracking; tracking for online behavioral advertising;
or some middle ground broad definition with certain exceptions (as in CDT's or EFF's proposals)—
participants were fairly evenly divided on which proposal they would prefer to start with. Among the
same set of choices, participants were also asked which would be a non-starter: while there were
objections to the broad definition and the OBA-only definition, no one responded that the CDT-style
proposal was an unacceptable starting point.”).
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polls.105 Addressing this method, one participant complained, “There are billions
of dollars at stake and the future of the Internet, and we’re trying to decide if one
third-party is covered or didn’t hum louder!”106
The march of the Working Group is described in detail in a July 16, 2013,
memorandum by Peter Swire, the Working Group’s co-chair at the time.107 This
Article is not intended to exhaustively document the Working Group’s
deliberations, but rather to assess its (lack of) outcome as a test case for
multistakeholder policymaking, in light of the claimed advantages of
multistakeholder-driven self-regulation and co-regulation.
A. Expeditious Decision-Making
Pursuant to the preliminary workshop at Princeton in April 2011, the Working
Group first met in September 2011 on the MIT campus in Cambridge,
Massachusetts.108 The First Public Working Drafts for both parts were published in
November 2011.109 Since then,110 the Working Group has conducted 105
teleconferences (typically lasting ninety minutes each) and met seven more times
for multi-day face-to-face meetings, twice in Europe and the rest in the U.S., plus
an additional meeting of the Global Considerations Task Force in Berlin.111 In
addition, it hosted a high-traffic mailing list and a web-based issue tracker.112 The
Working Group has seen the departure of two chairs as well as key staffers.113 It
currently lists ninety-nine participants from forty-two organizations as well as
seven “Invited Experts.”114 If participants agree on one thing, it is that the process
was long, drawn out, and time consuming.115
The Working Group was originally chartered through July 2012.116 The
105. Id.
106. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Participant (Dec. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Anonymous
Participant Interview (Dec. 19, 2013)].
107. Explanatory Memorandum for Working Group Decision on “What Base Text to Use for the Do
Not Track Compliance Specification,” WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM (July 16, 2013),
www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/2013-july-explanatory-memo [hereinafter Base Text for DNT].
108. See Tracking Protection Working Group Charter, supra note 102.
109. See Press Release, Ian Jacobs, World Wide Web Consortium, W3C Announces First Draft of
Standard for Online Privacy (Nov. 14, 2011) (available at http://www.w3.org/2011/11/dnt-pr.html.en).
110. The numbers cited in this paragraph are updated through March 10, 2014.
111. See Tracking Protection Working Group, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM,
http://www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection (last visited Mar. 10, 2014).
112. See Issues, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM, www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/track/
issues (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
113. See Sam Pfeifle, Is This the End for DNT? DAA Pulls Out of W3C Process, IAPP: THE PRIVACY
ADVISOR
(Sept. 17, 2013), https://www.privacyassociation.org/publications/is_this_the_end_for_
dnt_daa_pulls_out_of_w3c_process; Demedia, Leadership Change at W3C’s Do Not Track Effort
Reveals Lack of Online Industry Commitment to Protect Internet Privacy, CTR. FOR DIGITAL
DEMOCRACY (Nov. 28, 2012, 2:14 PM), http://www.democraticmedia.org/leadership-changew3c%E2%80%99s-do-not-track-effort-reveals-lack-online-industry-commitment-protect-internet.
114. See Participants in the Tracking Protection Working Group, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM
(Sept. 16, 2013), www.w3.org/2000/09/dbwg/details?group=49311&public=1.
115. Mayer Interview, supra note 1; Anonymous Participant Interview (Dec. 19, 2013), supra note
106; Hanff Interview, infra note 139; Anonymous Participant Interview (Dec. 16, 2013), infra note 153;
Verdi Interview, infra note 157; McNabb Interview, infra note 182.
116. See Tracking Protection Working Group Charter, supra note 102.
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charter has been extended twice, currently running until April 2014.117 After more
than two years of deliberations and failure to achieve its stated goals, it is safe to
say that the Working Group did not obtain a result expeditiously. To be sure, the
Working Group has been successful in fostering multistakeholder discussion (and
garnering media attention).118 As Jonathan Mayer, a Stanford graduate student in
computer science and law who participated in the process as an “invited expert”
said, “Where it has been successful is uncovering all of the possible issues
surrounding the particular topic. It’s been very good at discussion, pulling out
points of view, looking at how large the gap or divide may be.”119
This is not stated cynically. An exchange of ideas, data, and proposals between
various stakeholders in the Internet economy is a laudable goal, albeit not the
Working Group’s purpose. Mayer stated,
this notion—that groups that have had radically different views on major policy
issues for a long time are going to sit down and negotiate for half a year or a year
and come to some agreement that reconciles those views—it sounds like a pretty
big stretch. Not impossible—you could imagine ways in which they were talking
past each other, there were some misunderstandings, or some way of
120
accommodating both visions—but unlikely.

In what follows, this Part identifies several factors that hampered the Working
Group’s quest for a swift resolution:
1. Decision-Making Rules
First and foremost, the Working Group’s rules for decision-making were not
clear, leading to protracted and often circular discussions without an exit strategy.
The W3C website states, “W3C Working Groups make decisions via consensus. In
this context, consensus does not require unanimity, but majority votes are a last
resort. The chairs are responsible for determining and recording consensus.”121
Yet, what does consensus mean in the context of the Working Group’s DNT
discussions?122 Surely it cannot mean unanimity, which would embolden each and
every participant to hold up an accord. But what, short of unanimity but stricter
than simple majority, constitutes consensus?

117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Natasha Singer, Do Not Track? Advertisers Say ‘Don’t Tread on Us’, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct.14, 2012, at BU3, available at www.nytimes.com/2012/10/14/technology/do-not-track-movementis-drawing-advertisers-fire.html; Somini Sengupta & Natasha Singer, ‘Do Not Track’ Rules Come a Step
Closer to an Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2013, at B3, available at
www.nytimes.com/2013/07/16/technology/do-not-track-rules-for-advertising-to-web-users-come-a-stepcloser-to-an-agreement.html; Claire Davenport, 'Do Not Track': Europe Wonders Why Tech Companies
Are Dragging Their Feet, HUFFINGTON POST, (Oct. 10, 2012), www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/10/donot-track-europe_n_1955713.html; Don't Keep on Trackin', ECONOMIST BABBAGE BLOG (May 26,
2012), www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2012/05/online-advertising.
119. Mayer Interview, supra note 1.
120. Id.
121. Tracking Protection Working Group—Frequently Asked Questions, WORLD WIDE WEB
CONSORTIUM, www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/faq (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
122. See W3C Process Document, 3.3 Consensus, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM,
www.w3.org/2005/10/Process-20051014/policies#Consensus (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
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Several participants complained that not only were the rules of engagement
unclear from the start, but they were also changed frequently throughout the
process. Mayer said that
the rules pretty much changed depending on the time and depending on whom you
asked. To hear the chairs tell it early on, there needed to be agreement across at
least three broad stakeholder views: the companies that were tracking users
(advertising, analytics, social and so on), the web browsers, and the participants
who roughly represented user concerns. If you want to slice and dice a little more
finely, you might say something like, we will break out advertising, analytics, and
social; we might break out big versus small companies; then web browsers; then
maybe we break out activists versus researchers versus policymakers. But some
123
rough notion of buckets, and you had to get agreement from all of these.

Clearly, participants did not know which stakeholders needed to sign off on a
deal before consensus was announced. And whereas “hum” polls were accepted
for determining consensus early on in the process, some decisions were later made
via online voting, where supporters of a proposition vote “+1” and opponents “1.”124 This implies a simple majority rule, quite distant from the consensus-based
model anticipated by some of the participants.
2. Representation and Composition
The requisite voting majority touches on the related issue of representation.
Formal policymaking processes are typically run according to clear rules of
representation.125 The fact that there are as many representatives from Delaware in
the Senate as there are from Texas could conceivably be controversial, but it is
grounded in rules written into the Constitution.126 In top-down regulation, elected
officials or regulators whom they appoint are the ones driving policymaking,
providing a degree of public representation and accountability.127 Yet, when it
comes to self- or co-regulatory multistakeholder processes, equitable representation
norms are fickle.
Whom are Working Group participants representing? For example, did
Mayer, the Stanford PhD student and privacy advocate who joined the Working
Group as an “invited expert,” represent 2.5 billion Internet users or just himself?
Or perhaps something in between, such as all Internet users who live in Palo Alto
and own a Mac? Similarly, among the many industry participants, should votes be
weighed by consumer base, market share or some other criteria, or should Google’s
vote be equal to that of a small online ad intermediary? Clearly, if the votes are not
weighed, but rather tallied by show of hands, the composition of the Working
Group becomes determinative. Indeed, “packing” the Working Group with as
123. Mayer Interview, supra note 1.
124. See, e.g., Draft Minutes from Tracking Protection Working Group Teleconference, WORLD
WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM (June 19, 2013), www.w3.org/2013/06/19-dnt-minutes.
125. See generally Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal
International Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3 (1998).
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
127. See generally William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and
Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
66 (2004).
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many allies as possible can ensure a desirable result.
Packing the Working Group was possible, though costly, given that
participation fees amounted to more than $68,000 for large companies,128 $7,900
for small and medium size companies and large NGOs,129 and $2,250 for small
enterprises with less than 10 employees.130 Some advocates argued that the
strategy for industry was to pay for as many participants as possible, sometimes
resulting in industry groups overlapping with their constituents.131 For example,
the DAA attended the Working Group together with its constituent industry groups,
the American Association of Advertising Agencies (4A’s), Direct Marketing
Association, Interactive Advertising Bureau, and NAI, as well as multiple
corporate members of these groups.132 In this context it was not always clear
whether, on any given issue, an industry group represented all of its members, a
majority thereof, or perhaps only itself.
Mayer argued that the imperative for industry was not to pack the Working
Group so as to assure passage of resolutions, but rather to prevent any resolution
that may be damaging. In his words,
One strategic call that advertising groups made—that I think was a very good call
for their part—was to try to pack the group, to try to get as many people in. Not
necessarily because they thought they could get anything done that way, but
because they thought it would make it really, really hard for the group to ever
133
come to any sort of agreement that they disagreed with.

While advocates argued that the Working Group was dominated by industry,
some industry participants claimed that the protracted discussions, necessary travel,
and substantial participation fee meant that the group was captured not by the
industry as a whole, but rather by a small subset consisting of large, multinational
corporations.134 Small- and medium-sized enterprises, which make up a large
portion of the Internet economy, particularly in areas still vibrant with
entrepreneurship and growth, were thus underrepresented and greatly
disadvantaged. Not only would they have to invest the high participation fee, but
they would also need to expend human resources to attend the meetings and follow
the discussion.
The only Working Group participants exempt from participation fees were

128. Defined as: “For-profit organization that has annual gross revenue, as measured by the most
recent audited statement, of greater than or equal to 50,000,000 USD.” Membership Fees – W3C: Fee
Table for United States, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM, www.w3.org/Consortium/
fees?countryCode=US&quarter=01-01&year=2014#results (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
129. Defined as: “All other organizations, including non-profit organizations and government
agencies.” Id.
130. Defined as: “Enterprises and non-profits with 10 or fewer employees, who are not also
membership organizations, revenues less than 3,000,000 USD and have never been a W3C Member.”
Id.
131. Mayer Interview, supra note 1.
132. See Participants in the Tracking Protection Working Group, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM
(Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.w3.org/2000/09/dbwg/details?group=49311&public=1&order=org.
133. Mayer Interview, supra note 1.
134. One participant noted that the W3C itself is industry funded. Anonymous Participant Interview
(Dec. 19, 2013), supra note 106.

456

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:2

those admitted by the chairs as “invited experts.”135 Currently, this group, whose
selection criteria remain opaque,136 comprises seven such “invited experts,”
including three privacy advocates (Jeffrey Chester, John Simpson, and Walter van
Holst), two academics (Edward Felten and Paul Ohm), a European academicregulator (Rob van Eijk), and a libertarian think tanker (Berin Szoka). In terms of
opportunity costs, even without participation fees, the burden on civil society
representatives was heavy. Privacy advocates had to spend their time and effort
gratis in dozens of meetings and web forums, while industry lawyers and lobbyists
were paid to represent their companies in the same discussions.137 Mayer added,
“The opportunity costs look very, very different and the ability to marshal
resources also.”138
3. Delay Tactics
One advocate, Alexander Hanff, argued that regardless of procedural rules, the
deck was stacked against civil society given that a good result for industry would
be for the Working Group to achieve no result at all.139 He claimed that during the
protracted discussions, industry could continue to run rampant using any available
and newly developed tracking technologies and capabilities.140 To stop the
snowball effect, civil society needed a clean “victory,” while industry’s best
strategy was to stall, pushing back deadline after deadline, while continuing to
track users.141 In his view, a potential win for civil society could only occur
through the judicial system or the court of public opinion,142 not via a
multistakeholder process.143
Mayer said,
[There were] myriad ways of delaying within the W3C process. It’s trivial to reraise an issue that’s been discussed for years. It’s almost laughable. The stuff
that people were talking about even before the W3C process is the very same stuff
we’re talking about today. It’s kind of like circling the drain but never actually
going down it. And so it’s really easy to continue to have those endless
144
discussions.

This approach, however, depicts industry as a monolith whose interest is to
avert regulation. In reality, industry comprises a plethora of voices, including

135. For a definition of “invited expert,” see Invited Expert and Collaborator Agreement, WORLD
WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM, http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Legal/2007/06-invited-expert (last visited
Apr. 21, 2014).
136. See Instructions for non-Members (Invited Experts), WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM,
http://www.w3.org/2004/08/invexp (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
137. Mayer Interview, supra note 1.
138. Id.
139. Interview with Alexander Hanff, privacy advocate, in Brussels, Belg. (Dec. 11, 2013)
[hereinafter Hanff Interview].
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Alan Travis, ID Cards Scheme to be Scrapped within 100 Days, THE GUARDIAN, May
27, 2010, 10:16 PM, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/may/27/theresa-may-scrapping-id-cards.
143. Hanff Interview, supra note 139.
144. Mayer Interview, supra note 1.
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factions that compete vigorously against one another.145 Indeed, some industry
participants said that their biggest concern throughout the process was not the
engagement with consumer advocates, but rather the power play between
companies trying to cement a competitive advantage via a global technology
standard while W3C remains on the sidelines.
4. The Role of the Chair
In any policymaking process, the role of the chair is key both in terms of
agenda setting and decision-making.146 Clearly, if the chair could break deadlock
and force a decision over the objection of some of the participants, he or she would
have the power to drive the process forward. Yet, in the case of the Working
Group, the chair lacked formal decision-making authority and acted more as a
facilitator.147 Importantly, the chair’s responsibilities did not include drafting the
deliverables, a task assigned to designated “editors.”148 In addition, from the
outset, the Working Group operated with two (currently three) co-chairs—in and of
itself a mode that weakens the chair’s role.149
Initially, the Working Group appointed two chairs: Matthias Schunter (first
with IBM and now Intel) led the development of the Tracking Preference
Expression Specification, which defines the technical mechanisms for expressing a
DNT preference; and Aleecia McDonald (first Mozilla and now Stanford) led the
development of the Tracking Compliance and Scope Specification, which defines
the meaning of a DNT preference and sets out practices for websites to comply
with this preference.150 In November 2012, Peter Swire (first Ohio State and now
Georgia Tech) succeeded McDonald as the co-chair for the compliance
specification.151 Swire, in turn, departed in August 2013 to join the President’s
Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies.152 When asked
about the chair’s selection process, one participant said,
They just come up with the name, there is no process. They give you no
transparency into who was considered, why various candidates were not
considered, or why they ultimately were not asked—or even those that were asked
and then politely rejected the offer. There was no transparency into any of that

145. This is an area where the first-party and third-party distinction made a big difference. For some
of the intricacies of the still unresolved first-party/third-party distinction, see issues 9, 10, 49, 50, 54, 59,
66, 72, 73, 77, 91, 123, 137, 140, 154, 159 and 203 in Issues, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM,
http://www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/track/issues (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
146. See, e.g., Jonas Tallberg, The Power of the Chair: Formal Leadership in International
Cooperation, 54 INT’L STUD. Q. 241 (2010).
147. See
W3C
Process
Document,
WORLD
WIDE
WEB
CONSORTIUM,
http://www.w3.org/2005/10/Process-20051014/policies.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
148. See
W3C
Editors’
Home
Page,
WORLD
WIDE
WEB
CONSORTIUM,
http://www.w3.org/2003/Editors (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
149. See Tracking Protection Working Group Charter, supra note 102.
150. See Base Text for DNT, supra note 107.
151. Id.
152. Peter Swire, My Appointment to President’s Review Group, and Resignation as Co-Chair,
WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM (Aug. 27, 2013), http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/publictracking/2013Aug/0024.html.
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process; it was just a name delivered at the end of the day.

Several Working Group participants noted that during McDonald’s term, the
role of the chair was viewed as an enabler of discussion, in charge of helping
bridge differences between the different factions. In the words of a participant,
“the chair was otherwise a first among equals, just another voice in the group.”154
Swire, on the other hand, sought to be more proactive, but his quest too fell flat
amid a storm of allegations, with multiple participants questioning the source of his
authority to substitute his own judgment for that of the Working Group.155
Referring to the chairs’ efforts, Mayer said, “There were many, many people from
advertising companies and advocacy groups who were just unhappy across the
board because of this notion that ‘hey, the chairs are wonderful, but what special
legitimacy do they have to decide how the rules of the road should go on web
browsers?’”156
5. Drafting a Straw Man
A related issue concerns the identity and role of the party “holding the pen.”
To prevent endless discussion, particularly of issues with complex social, economic
and even philosophical dimensions, such as those implicated in DNT, someone
must ground the debate in a straw man document, which can be thoroughly edited
and even replaced during the process.157 As Mayer said, “The factual exploration
is great, and it’s a necessary predicate to the work getting done, but we want to
make sure people remember that it’s a predicate; it’s not the goal.”158 In
multistakeholder processes organized by the FTC and California Attorney
General,159 it was evident that regardless of stakeholder input, the regulator held the
pen. Despite the NTIA not itself holding enforcement powers, even that process
was channeled to a document written by the organizer itself.160 Conversely, the
Working Group discussions ran rampant without a backstop, as even the chairs
were unauthorized to crystalize the discussion into a compromise text.161
153. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Participant (Dec. 16, 2013) [hereinafter Anonymous
Participant Interview (Dec. 16, 2013)].
154. Mayer Interview, supra note 1.
155. Katy Bachman, Turmoil Surfaces in the Do Not Track Group, Process Disagreement May
Derail Consensus, ADWEEK, July 19, 2013, http://www.adweek.com/news/technology/turmoil-surfacesdo-not-track-group-151307.
156. Mayer Interview, supra note 1.
157. Telephone Interview by Kelsey Finch with John Verdi, Dir. of Privacy Initiatives, Nat’l
Telecomm. & Info. Admin. (Dec. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Verdi Interview].
158. Mayer Interview, supra note 1.
159. Kamala D. Harris, Att’y Gen., Cal. Dep’t of Justice, Privacy on the Go: Recommendations for
the Mobile Ecosystem (Jan. 2013), http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/pdfs/privacy/privacy_on_the_go.pdf.
160. Privacy Multistakeholder Process: Mobile Application Transparency, NAT’L TELECOMM. &
INFO. ADMIN.
(Nov.
12,
2013),
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-publication/2013/privacymultistakeholder-process-mobile-application-transparency.
161. See public-tracking@w3.org Mail Archives, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM,
http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-tracking/#latest (last visited Mar. 14, 2014) (indicating over
9,000 participant comments to date); Tracking Protection Working Group Issue Tracking, WORLD WIDE
WEB CONSORTIUM, http://www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/track/issues (last visited Mar. 14,
2014) (indicating 242 issues listed to date); W3C Process Document, supra note 147.
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6. Web-Based Communications Tools
Another potentially complicating factor for the discussion was the Working
Group’s use of an official backchannel, an active email listserv for debating the
open issues.162 Mayer explained that the online discussions “had a tendency to get
a little vitriolic at times, where it wasn’t even meant that way it was just that—as
anyone who sends email knows—it’s super easy to misunderstand the tone
someone uses.”163 Some participants stated they felt obliged to be constantly
engaged on the backchannel to immediately refute any position they disagreed with
lest others assume they concurred.164
John Verdi of the NTIA, which had no official backchannel, noted “we wanted
to keep the process as open as possible, so what happened in the room was the
official record; this kept everyone on the same page, and we didn’t have people
saying ‘oh, I raised this on the list’ or ‘I opened this issue on the backchannel.’”165
He added that, “remote participation is challenging to get right, but important to
provide. No geographic location has a monopoly on expertise, so we need to do
the best we can to enable participation from stakeholders outside DC.”166
Mayer noted that towards the last stages of the process, there was a sense that a
deal may be being negotiated behind the scenes where not everyone had a voice.
He stated:
That rankled a bunch of folks in the group. And this came out through the
framework and drafts and so on that were getting pitched—these documents
seemingly came out of nowhere. But clearly they came out of some backroom
167
talks between certain groups of stakeholders. That was really uncomfortable.

The Working Group used another web-based communication resource—an
issue tracker intended to capture and contain the open and closed topics for
discussion.168 Alas, use of this tool became daunting, given that the Working
Group was unable to close an issue without at the same time opening several more,
whether duplicative, linked, or entirely independent.169 Instead of streamlining the
discussion and stimulating progress, the issue tracker contributed to a chaotic
environment and facilitated what some participants characterized as filibuster
tactics.170 Conceivably, if the chairs controlled the list of open issues, the issue
tracker could have been conducive to progress. Yet, as discussed above, the
Working Group chairs were not perceived as empowered to even decide whether an
issue remains outstanding or not.171

162. See public-tracking@w3.org Mail Archives, supra note 161.
163. Mayer Interview, supra note 1.
164. Anonymous Participant Interview (Dec. 16, 2013), supra note 153.
165. Verdi Interview, supra note 157.
166. Id.
167. Mayer Interview, supra note 1.
168. See Issues, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM, http://www.w3.org/2011/trackingprotection/track/issues (last visited Mar. 22, 2014) (currently listing in excess of 240 issues).
169. See Tracking Protection Working Group Issue Tracking, supra note 161.
170. Mayer Interview, supra note 1.
171. See supra Part IV.A.4.
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B. Informed by Industry Knowledge and Expertise
One of the main perceived virtues of multistakeholder policymaking is the
ability to draw on the knowledge and expertise of multiple parties from various
parts of the ecosystem. This is only true, however, if the parties can agree on the
facts. In the DNT context, this was not typically the case. Quite the contrary,
Working Group participants consistently sparred over basic concepts, terms, and
definitions, such as the level of data collection required to ensure basic online
functionality.172 Indeed, after more than two years of deliberations, the Working
Group has not yet been able to define many of the fundamental terms underlying a
tracking protection policy, not least the meaning of “tracking” itself.173 As Swire
noted in the Chair’s Explanatory Memorandum, “Defining the term ‘tracking’ is
obviously an important aspect of defining the meaning of ‘Do Not Track.’”174
1. Arguing over Facts
Consider, for example, data de-identification.175 A deep rift separated the
position of several “invited experts,” such as Edward Felten (Princeton) and
Jonathan Mayer (Stanford), from those of industry voices such as Shane Wiley
(Yahoo).176 While Wiley argued that hashing unique identifiers would be sufficient
to separate data from real world identities, Felten and Mayer believed that as long
as such pseudonymized data could be re-identified, it must be viewed as
personal.177 As Mayer said, “we’d have these radically different views—radically
different technical views, not just talking policy implications. There was just no
way of reconciling them. The W3C had no way of saying ‘okay, pony up with your
technical experts.’”178 Hence, the disagreements were not over policy or legal
interpretation, but rather around the facts. In the words of Albert Einstein, “If the
facts don't fit the theory, change the facts.”179
2. Engineers vs. Lawyers
Some participants lamented the steady shift of the Working Group makeup
from a tight-knit engineering clique to a group dominated by lawyers and
government relations professionals.180 This is not surprising, given that the issues
172. See David Goldman, Do Not Track Proposal Is DOA, CNNMONEY, July 16, 2013, 1:47 PM,
http://money.cnn.com/2013/07/16/technology/do-not-track.
173. Other crucial concepts that remain elusive are “de-identified data,” the distinction between
“first-” and “third-parties,” “permitted uses,” and more. See Tracking Compliance and Scope, WORLD
WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/drafts/trackingcompliance.html#scope-and-goals.
174. See Base Text for DNT, supra note 107.
175. Issue-188: Definition of De-Identified (Or Previously, Unlinkable) Data, WORLD WIDE WEB
CONSORTIUM, http://www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/track/issues/188 (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
176. See, e.g., E-mail from Shane Wiley, Yahoo, to Dan Auerbach, EFF (Oct. 23, 2012) (available at
http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-tracking/2012Oct/0447.html).
177. Id.
178. Mayer Interview, supra note 1.
179. Attributed.
See
BRAINYQUOTE,
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/a/
alberteins136887.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
180. Doty & Mulligan, supra note 2, at 153-54.
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on the agenda cut to the core of high stakes business and social policy
considerations. In medieval days, a discussion among scientists would cease to be
purely scientific when the existence of god became an issue. At that point, the
bishops would rush into the room. Similarly, when Working Group discussions
became fraught with business and policy implications, the nature of the
discussants’ expertise shifted as well.181
One complication participants noted about dealing with lawyers and
government affairs professionals is that they may not have sufficient technical
expertise. Joanne McNabb, Director of Privacy Education and Policy at the
California Attorney General’s Office, who participated in the process run by her
office, said:
[Lawyers and government affairs professionals] don’t have the actual knowledge
that you need, so they have to keep going back, back, back. We made an effort to
get people who are not only with this particular stakeholder but also have the
operational or more direct knowledge of what the issue is. And, at the very least,
to encourage the government affairs representatives, if they’re the ones who end
up coming, to go back and get to the people who are actually going to have the
182
substantive knowledge and get them engaged.

In addition, some participants thought that as a matter of professional ethos,
engineers viewed the issues as problems to solve, while government affairs and
legal experts were less likely to come to agreement.183
C. Fostering Collaboration and Compliance
Proponents of a multistakeholder process claim that rules negotiated by the
industry are more likely to foster implementation and compliance. Instead, the
Working Group discussions increasingly became more polarized and accompanied
by a constant drumbeat of warnings that industry players would vote with their feet
and ignore any result that came short of their expectations.
1. Good Spec; No Implementation
This dire prediction resonates in light of the historical example of another
W3C foray into policymaking, the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) standard
issued in 2002.184 P3P was conceived as a standard allowing users and websites to
match privacy policies through machine-readable code.185 Specifically, P3P would
enable machine-readable privacy policies that could be retrieved automatically by
web browsers or other user agents.186 The browser would then compare each
181. Id.
182. Telephone Interview with Joanne McNabb, Dir. Privacy Educ. & Policy, Cal. Att’y Gen. Office
(Dec. 15, 2013) [hereinafter McNabb Interview].
183. Id.
184. Lorie Cranor et al., The Platform for Privacy Preferences 1.0 (P3P1.0) Specification, W3C
Recommendation, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM (Apr. 16, 2002), http://www.w3.org/TR/P3P.
185. See id.; Ari Schwartz, Looking Back at P3P: Lessons for the Future, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY &
TECH. (Nov. 2009), http://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/P3P_Retro_Final_0.pdf.
186. Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) Project, Enabling Smarter Privacy Tools for the Web,
WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM (Nov. 20, 2007), http://www.w3.org/P3P.
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policy against a user’s privacy preferences and assist the user in deciding when to
exchange data with a website or deploy additional features, such as user alerts or
cookie blockers.187
To discuss implementation, the W3C set up a working group, which embarked
on a long and laborious process spanning almost a decade.188 Lorrie Cranor, who
led the discussions, compared the process to “an out-of-control construction on a
kitchen that at first only needs a small new appliance (a toaster) but ends up with a
plan for new cabinets, floors and lighting.”189 On the one hand, privacy advocates
opposed P3P on the grounds that industry groups were using it “as an excuse to
delay the progress of genuine enforceable privacy rights in the US”;190 the
European Article 29 Working Party voiced similar concerns.191 On the other hand,
industry viewed the emerging standard with suspicion, concerned about excessive
transparency and the potential impact on business practices.192
After initial roll out, P3P appeared to have a “chicken and egg” problem: P3P
policies would not be created until there was implementation by a widely used web
browser, but browser implementation would not do anything until there were
policies online.193 Microsoft’s Internet Explorer was the only major browser to
adopt P3P, and it continues to do so to this day.194 However, most Internet
Explorer users remain completely unaware of P3P.195 Worse, thousands of
websites, including some of the web’s most popular sites, “post bogus P3P
‘compact policies’ that circumvent the default P3P-based cookie-blocking system
in Internet Explorer.”196
In many ways, the Working Group effort to standardize DNT is reminiscent of
the P3P fiasco. As Mayer said, “At the end of the day, if you come out with
something that only one company wants to implement—and this is an understood,
voluntary process—then hopefully the collective should understand that it was a
failure.”197

187. The Platform for Privacy Preferences 1.0 (P3P1.0) Specification, WORLD WIDE WEB
CONSORTIUM (Apr. 16, 2002), http://www.w3.org/TR/P3P.
188. The W3C started its work on P3P in 1997 and the P3P Specification Working Group was
chartered in July 1999.
189. See Schwartz, supra note 185, at 3.
190. Cranor et al., supra note 184.
191. WORKING PARTY 11, WORKING PARTY ON THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH REGARD TO
THE PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA, OPINION 1/98: PLATFORM FOR PRIVACY PREFERENCES (P3P)
AND
THE
OPEN PROFILING STANDARD (OPS) (June 16, 1998), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/1998/wp11_en.pdf.
192. See, e.g., Fran Maier, More on the Problem with P3P, TRUSTE BLOG, Sept. 14, 2010,
http://www.truste.com/blog/2010/09/14/more-on-the-problem-with-p3p.
193. Schwartz, supra note 185, at 8 (“Either the market will work or direct regulation will dictate the
value for the companies, or the idea will fail, but in no case is it possible for the developers of a concept
like P3P to create critical mass of acceptance among Web sites.”).
194. Privacy in Internet Explorer, WINDOWS DEVELOPER NETWORK, http://msdn.microsoft.com/enus/library/ms537343.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
195. Lorrie Faith Cranor, Necessary but Not Sufficient: Standardized Mechanisms for Privacy Notice
and Choice, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 273, 281 (2012).
196. Lorrie Cranor, P3P is Dead, Long Live P3P!, THIS THING, Dec. 3, 2012,
http://lorrie.cranor.org/blog/2012/12/03/p3p-is-dead-long-live-p3p (emphasis added).
197. Mayer Interview, supra note 1.
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2. Incentive to Comply?
What is the incentive on the part of industry to adopt a standard produced
through a multistakeholder process? If multistakeholder input is sought as part of a
formal process of top-down regulation, such as in notice and comment rulemaking,
industry will engage in order to influence the resulting framework. If negotiations
take place against a backdrop of binding legislation, industry could be in it to
benefit from an enforcement safe harbor or clearer statutory guidance.
The NTIA process is a hybrid between a “quasi voluntary” discussion with a
regulator, such as the FTC or California Attorney General, and a purely voluntary
process, such as the Working Group. On the one hand, the NTIA does not have
enforcement powers and cannot impose a compromise. On the other hand, a
process orchestrated by the U.S. government is likely to command close attention
from the industry. The fear, which some think materialized,198 is that an accord
reached in these circumstances—obligatory participation but little enforcement
prospect—will be vague or narrow in scope and not command a large following.
The dynamic is very different in the context of the Working Group, which
operates in the absence of existing regulation. Here, stalling tactics come at no
cost, and the process could ostensibly continue forever.
3. External Disruptions
Despite all of the shortcomings discussed above, the Working Group would
have been in relatively good shape had it not been for several exogenous
disruptions. All of the participants interviewed, including both privacy advocates
and industry representatives, pointed to Microsoft’s August 2012 decision to switch
DNT on by default in Internet Explorer199 as a cataclysmic event for the Working
Group.200 After that, the process spiraled out of control and focused on struggling
to keep the stakeholders at the table. An additional blow came in February 2013,
when Mozilla announced it would set Firefox browsers to automatically block
third-party cookies.201
The move by Microsoft, whose various versions of Internet Explorer continue
to command more than 50% of the desktop market,202 was particularly significant,
because the industry recoiled from any contemplated compromise. Industry
representatives were prepared to negotiate the specifics of an opt-out tool, realizing
198. See supra text accompanying note 88.
199. Brendon Lynch, Do Not Track in the Windows 8 Setup Experience, MICROSOFT ON THE ISSUES,
Aug. 7, 2012, 10:00 AM, http://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft_on_the_issues/archive/2012/08/07/donot-track-in-the-windows-8-set-up-experience.aspx; see also Ryan Singel, In Ad Network Nightmare,
Microsoft Making ‘Do Not Track’ Default for IE 10, WIRED, May 31, 2012, 8:04 PM,
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/05/ie10-do-not-track.
200. Mayer Interview, supra note 1; Anonymous Participant Interview (Dec. 19, 2013), supra note
106; Hanff Interview, supra note 139; Anonymous Participant Interview (Dec. 16, 2013), supra note
153; Verdi Interview, supra note 157; McNabb Interview, supra note 182.
201. Gregg Keizer, Firefox to Auto-Block Third-Party Ad Cookies by Summer, COMPUTERWORLD,
Feb. 25, 2013, 6:40 AM, http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9237105/Firefox_to_auto_block_
third_party_ad_cookies_by_summer.
202. See Desktop Browser Version Market Share (February 2014), NETMARKETSHARE.COM,
http://www.netmarketshare.com/browser-market-share.aspx?qprid=2&qpcustomd=0.
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that the majority of users would not tamper with the default.203 The implications of
a major browser automatically opting-out users were grim for any business
operating in the online advertising space. Industry, thus, retrenched and acted as if
it was fighting for survival.204 Referring to Microsoft’s move, one participant
remarked, “The trust was gone. There was no trust left. They’d been in the process
for a year agreeing on default off, and then unilaterally made this massive public
statement to gain their own competitive advantage against Google and others.”205
Mayer suggested, however, that major external events could conceivably serve
as a catalyst for concessions:
When it looked like Microsoft’s decision to enable DNT by default in a beta
version of Internet Explorer was going to potentially jeopardize negotiations,
advocates suddenly made some concessions. And when it looked like companies
were going to start cracking down on technical countermeasures—browser
companies, too—there were some hints of concessions out of the ad industry. So,
W3C provides the forum, but it was things outside of W3C that moved the needle
206
on how close to an agreement we were.

Microsoft’s announcement was not the only external event to rock the boat.
Other notable disruptions were caused by change of personnel, including two of the
chairs, as well as the decision of the DAA to leave the process.207 And while such
developments are not unexpected in the context of a process that lingers for years,
they clearly did not improve the odds for the Working Group to reach an accord.
V. CONCLUSION
Profound technological changes and shifting social norms have forced privacy
policymakers to chase a rapidly moving target. This has led government and
regulatory agencies to coopt industry and civil society representatives in search of
self- or co-regulatory models based on multistakeholder discourse. The purported
advantages of multistakeholder policymaking abound and include fact- and
experience-based deliberations, expeditious results, and enhanced implementation
and compliance. This Article assesses why one such process, the W3C quest to
standardize DNT, failed to deliver along these vectors. Instead, W3C’s efforts
featured protracted discussions not leading to tangible results, erratic decisionmaking processes, persistent disagreement over facts, and gloomy predictions
about the prospects of implementation should a standard arise.
Based on a series of interviews with participants in the process, including
leading industry, civil society, and government voices, this Article identifies
shortcomings in the Working Group process, including the absence of clear rules of

203. See, e.g., E-mail from Mike Zaneis, Interactive Adver. Bureau, to Jeffrey Chester, Ctr. for
Digital Democracy (July 26, 2012) (available at http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/publictracking/2012Jul/0153.html).
204. Id.
205. Anonymous Participant Interview (Dec. 19, 2013), supra note 106.
206. Mayer Interview, supra note 1.
207. See Aaron Taube, Advertising Group Pulls Out of Internet Tracking Negotiation, BUS. INSIDER,
Sept. 17, 2013, 11:54 AM, www.businessinsider.com/ad-industry-leaves-do-not-track-negotiations2013-9.
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engagement, soft deadlines and a vague definition of deliverables, constrained
chairs with little decision-making power, and potentially unbalanced
representation.
These shortcomings do not necessarily imply that multistakeholder processes
are fundamentally flawed. As a vehicle for self- or co-regulation, they should not
be judged in a vacuum, but rather against alternative rulemaking processes. Given
the gridlock in Washington and Brussels, multistakeholder processes may yet bring
more promise to policymaking in the privacy space than any tangible alternative.
Moreover, this Article does not assert that every multistakeholder policymaking
process is destined to end like DNT. Some of the failings of the Working Group,
such as unclear rules of representation, may be endemic to multistakeholder
processes; others, such as pay-to-play obligations and a backchannel for discussion,
may be more specific to the W3C, or even the alignment of forces within the
Working Group.
However, to avoid evident pitfalls, multistakeholder processes should: 1) be
structured around manifest and achievable goals; 2) set forth clear procedures for
voting, decision-making, and consensus; 3) devise rational, fair rules of
representation, taking into account the relative costs and benefits and access to
resources that various stakeholders have; 4) seek to coalesce around straw man
documents as early as possible in the process; 5) empower a chair or editor to
express decisions in writing; and 6) optimally operate under a backstop of formal
rulemaking, which will reduce any incentive to stall. In short, with firm structure
and strong leadership, multistakeholder processes may perform better than
evidenced by the W3C DNT Working Group.

